Talk:1948 Palestine war/Archive 7

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Religious character of the war

Should we add a section to discuss whether the Palestine war was, at its core, a religious or a nationalistic one? This could also include religious motivations that animated the Palestinian Arab and foreign volunteer fighters, as well as the religious significance of the region.

Benny Morris asserts in his book that "The 1948 War was a war of religion as much as, if not more, a nationalist war over territory." On the other hand, other scholars have stated that religion was merely a tactical tool by the Arab leaders.

Morris provides various quotes to back his point. A couple excerpts:

The Jewish rejection of the Prophet Muhammad is embedded in the Qur'an and is etched in the psyche of those brought up on its suras. As the Muslim Brotherhood put it in 1948: "Jews are the historic enemies of Muslims and carry the greatest hatred for the nation of Muhammad." Such thinking characterized the Arab world, where the overwhelming majority of the population were, and remain, believers.

In 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt sent out feelers about a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia responded that he was "prepared to receive anyone of any religion except (repeat except) a Jew." A few weeks earlier, Ibn Saud had explained, in a letter to Roosevelt: "Palestine ... has been an Arab country since the dawn of history and ... was never inhabited by the Jews for more than a period of time, during which their history in the land was full of murder and cruelty.... [There is] religious hostility ... between the Moslems and the Jews from the beginning of Islam ... which arose from the treacherous conduct of the Jews towards Islam and the Moslems and their prophet."

Historians have tended to ignore or dismiss, as so much hot air, the jihadi rhetoric and flourishes that accompanied the two-stage assault on the Yishuv and the constant references in the prevailing Arab discourse to that earlier bout of Islamic battle for the Holy Land, against the Crusaders. This is a mistake. The 1948 War, from the Arabs' perspective, was a war of religion as much as, if not more than, a nationalist war over territory. Put another way, the territory was sacred: its violation by infidels was sufficient grounds for launching a holy war and its conquest or reconquest, a divinely ordained necessity.

In the months before the invasion of 15 May 1948, King Abdullah, the most moderate of the coalition leaders, repeatedly spoke of "saving" the holy places. As the day of invasion approached, his focus on Jerusalem, according to Alec Kirkbride, grew increasingly obsessive. "In our souls," wrote the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, "Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract nationalist feelings. In it we have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples."

The jihadi impulse underscored both popular and governmental responses in the Arab world to the UN partition resolution and was central to the mobilization of the "street" and the governments for the successive onslaughts of November-December 1947 and May-June 1948. The mosques, mullahs, and gulema all played a pivotal role in the process. Even Christian Arabs appear to have adopted the jihadi discourse. Matiel Mughannam, the Lebanese-born Christian who headed the AHC-affiliated Arab Women's Organization in Palestine, told an interviewer early in the civil war: "The UN decision has united all Arabs, as they have never been united before, not even against the Crusaders.... [A Jewish state] has no chance to survive now that the `holy war' has been declared. All the Jews will eventually be massacred. " The Islamic fervor stoked by the hostilities seems to have encompassed all or almost all Arabs: "No Moslem can contemplate the holy places falling into Jewish hands," reported Kirkbride from Amman. "Even the Prime Minister [Tawfiq Abul Huda] ... who is by far the steadiest and most sensible Arab here, gets excited on the subject."

On 2 December [1947] the gulema, or council of doctors of theology and sacred law, of Al-Azhar University in Cairo – one of Islam's supreme authorities – proclaimed a "worldwide jihad in defense of Arab Palestine."

Amayorov (talk) 14:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Please read something other than just Benny Morris. Just clutching at snippets of POV-infused statements from Benny Morris is no way to go about understanding the topic, let alone establishing anything in a neutral, encyclopedic voice. Please gain an appreciation of some other sources. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not just Morris – the religious character of the war has been discussed at length in much of Israeli historiography.

If you disagree, we could include reference to other historians that consider that religion was only a minor factor. That is, in fact, exactly what I proposed. Amayorov (talk) 19:49, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

"Israeli historiography" – if it's an Israeli narrative then it needs to be delineated as such, but yes, more voices than Morris would be needed to support this, otherwise it's a Morris narrative, and we already have too much Morris. Though frankly, the sad clutch of quotes above hardly makes the point that Morris seems to think it does. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Just as "pro-Palestinian" or "Arab" historiography must be disclaimed.

I agree that references to other historians would be useful. I will work on that. Amayorov (talk) 20:06, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Morris (who recently wrote in Haaretz that Israel should nuke Iran without delay) took up the "jihad" idea after his "conversion" and it's sort of embarrassing. The transparent purpose is to deny the Palestinians any genuine reason for complaint. There were plenty of people on both sides who spouted religious nonsense; let's not play that game here. Zero^talk 12:55, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, but what you wrote doesn't constitute a historical argument.

The idea that the 1948 War was viewed through a religious lens was first advocated by Morris in his 2008 book, which was widely praised, even by non-Zionists like Avi Shlaim. This book has become a key reference for many scholars.

Sure, some scholars (Shlomo Ben-Ami, Yoav Gelber, etc) have said that Morris exaggerated the role of a "religious war," and that it wasn't as important as he suggested. However, a discussion of this could still be useful to add to the article. Amayorov (talk) 23:09, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

So you want to over-emphasize the main thing that reviewers of the book criticize as being over-emphasized in the work as one of its key drawbacks? It's the opposite. You should listen to the feedback from academic reviewers, and since they commonly chime in that Morris over-emphasizes religious background and motivations, that makes it more undue and fringe. Iskandar323 (talk) 02:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Morris overload

It's come to my attention that Benny Morris is quite gratuitously over-represented on this page relative to other historians, with 50+ citations and mentions. I'm not sure if any other historian crests half a dozen citations and mentions. On a page with just over 100 citations, the sea of Morris references is quite overbearing. This is a pretty clear balance issue. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:51, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I think that would be good! However, one must distinguish between backing up objective facts using a historian's research, and representing the conclusions that that historian draws from them as fact.

I don't have a problem with the former. Morris has done a massive amount of primary research, which he quotes in his books and which was later quoted by other authors, such as Shlaim, Flapan, Pappé and others. Amayorov (talk) 20:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Iskandar323 is right. إيان (talk) 05:26, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

This is a problem across many Wikipedia articles regarding this history. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:07, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Seems like this would be a situation to -add- further scholars, not just remove information. Arkon (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

There are different Morris "eras", seems to me, and I agree with Arkon, we should add sources, and if that results in Morris being drowned out on any point, so be it. I am not knocking Morris, one of the first sensible scholars from that side of the line but no need to overdo it, is there? Selfstudier (talk) 18:04, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries during and immediately after the war in the lede of this article? Alaexis_¿question? 23:05, 7 March 2024 (UTC)

Discussion (RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?)

• No, as discussed above in "Recent changes". The beginning of the exodus is only indirectly a consequence of the war and we should be striving for brevity in the lead of this article as there is much information to cover. Note also that though the lead is a summary of the body, the aftermath section of this article currently gives disproportionate attention to this aspect of the war's consequences and results. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 23:16, 7 March 2024 (UTC)

• Yes. This was a massive event, with hundreds of thousands people fleeing or emigrating. Multiple reliable sources (see the list here) agree that this was one of the major consequences of the war. Therefore a brief mention is warranted. Alaexis_¿question? 23:22, 7 March 2024 (UTC)
• No certainly it was an important event, but it was not an event that is a subtopic of this war. At most a small portion of the emigration was even indirectly related to this war, and the argument that we should include decades of immigration from a large number of countries not even involved in this war makes no sense. And the claim that reliable sources agree that it was a major consequence of the war is just not true. Morris says "The war indirectly created a second, major refugee problem", Schindler says In Arab countries, the defeat of the Arab armies and the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs exacerbated an already difficult situation. In December 1947, a pogrom and the destruction of synagogues in Aleppo persuaded half the city’s Jewish population to leave. In Egypt, arrests, killings and confiscations catalyzed the flight of nearly 40 per cent of the Jewis hcommunity by 1950. In Kuwait, the minuscule number of Jews were expelled. In Iraq, the Criminal Code was amended in July 1948 such that Zionists were lumped together with Anarchists and Communists. The death penalty could be meted out to adherents or they could be sentenced to many years’ imprisonment. Enforced emigration to Israel became the officially permitted route out of Iraq for an increasingly oppressed Jewish community. Israel ironically became the unlikely destination for many Jewish Communists despite their opposition to Zionism. In Libya, Algeria and Morocco, there were periodic outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. Over 37 per cent of Jews in Islamic countries – the Arab world, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan – left for Israel between May 1948 and the beginning of 1952. This amounted to 56 per cent of the total immigration. And he says that in a chapter on Jewish emigration, not in coverage of this war. It is an attempt at trying to balance what actually was a direct major consequence of this war, the expulsion and flight of 80-90% of the Palestinians from the territory Israel would come to control in this war, with an entirely different topic that was not a part of this war. And a ton of it was from countries not involved in this war at all. There are no sources that treat this as a major consequence of this war, and the claim that there is rests on the assumption that nobody will actually check, as it is so plainly not true, and been shown untrue on this talk page previously. Beyond that, there is no definition of immediately after that includes years and years later. nableezy - 00:09, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

No, it's a part of the IP conflict but not a significant-enough part of the 1948 war to merit being mentioned in the lead. While Morris says this is an "indirect" result of the war, I think the balance of sources do not treat this as a significant effect of the war, even indirectly. Further, in the RM for the article about the exodus, I quoted Tessler's book explaining the complicated factors he said was behind the exodus, and the war was only a small part of it; I won't reproduce the whole quote here but it applies to this RfC as well. It's something that happened over years during and after the war (1948-52), which is further evidence that while it's a part of the conflict, it's not a huge part of the (47-) '48 war. Levivich (talk) 01:25, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

• No, it wasn't a part of the 1948 war. Lots of things happened as a result of the foundation of Israel, but that's not the topic of this article. Zero^talk 02:48, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

  Elaborating, the exodus of Jews was a result of the foundation of Israel and the consequent implementation of Israeli policy. It would have happened without the war that accompanied Israel's foundation, so it is factually incorrect to call it a consequence of that war. Zero^talk 11:09, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

'It would have happened without the (1948) war. That is as hypothetical at least as the argument that the exodus was consequential on that war. For one thing, in an alternative history, one could imagine that the old Zionist priority to privilege Ashkenazi immigration over aliyah from 'Arabized' Jews (i.e. deemed slack, uneducated etc.,) probably would have prevailed, esp. given that they were the victims of a Holocaust whose mass immigration to the US and Great Britain was systematically blocked by those powers, for the usual electoral-antisemitic motives. 'Consequence' does not mean strictly an assertion of some mechanical 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' reasoning. Nishidani (talk) 13:25, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

• Ummmm. There is way to much in the lede already. It should be cut significantly down with superfluous language removed. It DOES NOT read as neutral. Most of the factual information should be in the body of the article. With that said, if the lede stays "as-is" then, yes, information about an exodus should be added if nothing more than to provide a more balanced perspective and neutrality. Slacker13 (talk) 05:49, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

No: It wasn't a direct effect of the war; just an indirect side-effect in the aftermath of the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:18, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

agreed Slacker13 (talk) 21:57, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

You might want to amend your vote and clarify your position on this, @Slacker13. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 22:04, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

• No I do not see evidence that this event was sufficiently closely related to be DUE in the lead of the article. (t · c) buidhe 04:44, 21 March 2024 (UTC)
• Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war, along with the Palestinian refugee problem. I agree with Alaexis. Marokwitz (talk) 07:27, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  The ethnic cleansing of Palestinians wasn't a consequence of the war: it began before the war, was partially a trigger for the war, and intensified during the war by design. It was a direct impact on the civilian population in the warzone. The subsequent exodus of Jews from other countries due to a range of push and pull factors, one of which was negative sentiment arising from the war (and the ethnic cleansing it entailed), was a consequence, but not a direct impact of the conflict. The two phenomena are in entirely different categories of immediacy to the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:26, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsion of Palestinians started only in April 1948 – six months into the civil war – and was a direct consequence of the conflict. According to Morris, the majority of the Palestinians fled out of fear of being caught up in hostilities, rather than being directly expelled. Therefore, the circumstances precipitating the flight of both the Arabs and the Jews were not dissimilar. Amayorov (talk) 20:59, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  Untrue. It began in 1947. Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114. Amayorov (talk) 19:39, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  That's completely false. Selfstudier (talk) 21:28, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114.

  From from Morris's 2008 book:

  ''During this period [by the end of March 1948] Jewish troops expelled the inhabitants of only one village-Qisariya, in the Coastal Plain, in mid-February.

  Though the Arabs had initiated the violence, they were quickly evincing signs of demoralization. ... Flight was the earliest and most concrete expression of Palestinian demoralization. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the (still low-key) hostilities [on 30 Nov 1947], Arab families began to abandon their homes in mixed or border neighborhoods in the big towns. Already on 30 November 1947 the HIS reported "the evacuation of Arab inhabitants from border neighborhoods" in Jerusalem and Jaffa. Arabs were also reported leaving the area around the Jewish Quarter of Safad (the town was predominantly Arab) and fleeing the villages of Jammasin and Sheikh Muwannis, bordering Tel Aviv. By 9 December, the HIS was reporting that "Arab refugees were sleeping in the streets [of Jaffa]" and "wealthy families were leaving the [coastal] citiesheading inland. [Many initially fled to the family's village of origin.] Rich people are emigrating to Syria, Lebanon, and even Cyprus." In one or two sites, there was deliberate Jewish intimidation of Arab neighbors to leave.

  Despite the haphazard efforts of some Arab local authorities, the following months were marked by increasing flight from the main towns and certain rural areas. By the end of March 1948 most of the wealthy and middleclass families had fled Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem, and most Arab rural communities had evacuated the heavily Jewish Coastal Plain; a few had also left the Upper Jordan Valley. Most were propelled by fear of being caught up, and harmed, in the fighting; some may have feared life under Jewish rule. It is probable that most thought of a short, temporary displacement with a return within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or international diktats.'' Amayorov (talk) 19:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  The Nakba did not start or end in 1948

  "When did the process of displacement actually begin? Though displacement of Palestinians from their lands by the Zionist project was already taking place during the British Mandate, mass displacement started when the UN partition plan was passed. In less than six months, from December 1947 to mid-May 1948, Zionist armed groups expelled about 440,000 Palestinians from 220 villages." Selfstudier (talk) 20:14, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Almost a half million Palestinians were displaced between December 1947 and May 1948. The greatest outflow of refugees took place in April and early May 1948 coinciding with the start of operations by Zionist paramilitary organizations. Trying to downplay what occurred pre Israel is not a good look. Selfstudier (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  "from December 1947 to mid-May 1948" – that is technically correct. Plan Dalet was only drawn up towards the end of March 1948, and practically all these expulsions happened between April 1 and May 15, 1948. Before then, it was the upper and middle class families that had evacuated, rather than expelled. Amayorov (talk) 20:21, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Says Morris Iskandar323 (talk) 20:25, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  According to Pappé, by the end of March 1948 thirty villages were depopulated of their Palestinian Arab population. So unless they were villages entirely populated by the upper and middle classes, something is rotten in the state of Morris' storytelling. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Pappé's "Ethnic Cleansing" does, indeed, refer to 30 villages, but doesn't provide their names or a reference. The nearest reference is in the next paragraph – which is to Morris. This again illustrates Pappé's general sloppiness with historical fact.

  Morris' book "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem revisited" (2004) provides an exhaustive list of each Palestinian settlement, the date of its depopulation, and the causes. He does care to distinguish direct expulsion from flight due to fear. This painstaking work again confirms his assertion (see p.1-13 and 130). Amayorov (talk) 20:53, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Does Morris contradict Pappé? Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  I hadn't realised quite how bad Morris' warped and selective narratives were. Now I realise it's very spun. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:24, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

• No per Nableezy, Levivich and Buidhe, The 'exodus' narrative emerged later to draw a false equivalence between the radical programmatic ethnic cleansing which Yishuv and then Israeli forces imposed on Palestinians during the war, and what occurred to Jews in Arab countries after the cessation of hostilities, often at the open invitation of the new state of Israel, which adopted a policy of encouraging Jews in those countries to make aliyah, not always successively, as their conditions deteriorated very much as a consequence of the impact of the image of mass expulsions on the 'Arab street'.Nishidani (talk) 09:04, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
• Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war. Vegan416 (talk) 23:29, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

  Can you give any sources that say that a. it was a consequence of the war, and b. it was one of the most important of those consequences? nableezy - 23:33, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

• No, it's not of great enough significance in regards to the war and it occurred after the cessation of hostilities. TarnishedPath^talk 10:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Recent changes

I revered multiple recent chanhes by @Amayorov. I didn't provide much reason in the edit sunmaries, any objections to my reversions can be discussed here. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:06, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Why did you revert the estimate of the number of people killed in massacres? According to Benny Morris, "About 800 civilians and prisoners of war killed in massacres." That is important because no other statement in the article gives a possible breakdown of the Arab casualties between civilians and soldiers.

Amayorov (talk) 17:39, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

@IOHANNVSVERVS A gentle reminder Amayorov (talk) 13:25, 13 July 2024 (UTC)

If it is to be included it would have to be atteibuted to Morris or else corroborated by other sources. Also the number of civilians killed in massacres specifically is probably not due for inclusion, especially since many civilians were killed in acts of terrorism etc which are not massacres. Furthermore Morris' "about 800" is not very sensible, there is a wide range of estimates for many of the massacres. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:24, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

Do all estimates have to be corroborates by more than one reference? For example, 20,000 casualties is sourced from Esber (2009), and isn't quoted anywhere else. That is the only citation from Esber on this page, and yet it's included, whereas Morris, who is the most referenced author anyway, is quoted selectively.

Morris estimates that 800 civilians were killed "all told – most of them in several clusters of massacres." He clearly includes acts of terrorism here.

You say that there is a wide range of estimates, and yet I can't find any other estimate of civilians killed anywhere. Amayorov (talk) 08:13, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

@IOHANNVSVERVS Why did you remove this estimate? Morris' estimate is for the entire 1947-9 war, including the civil war phase. In fact, many of those "eight hundred civilians and prisoners of war all told" were murdered before the Arab armies invasion in May – "in several clusters of massacres in captured villages in April-May". Amayorov (talk) 06:52, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

Why did you revert the description of Plan Dalet? This has been discussed on the Talk page here. The description of Plan Dalet as an offensive operation is controversial, as is described on the dedicated page. Amayorov (talk) 17:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

I don't want to engage in WP:STATUSQUOSTONEWALLING, but in this case I would say uou should try to get consensus for such a significant change. It was obviously an offensive operation, did you read the page about Plan Dalet? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:26, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

Yes, and that's what it says on Plan Dalet:

"This strategy is subject to controversy, with some historians characterizing it as defensive, while others assert that it was an integral part of a planned strategy for the expulsion, sometimes called an ethnic cleansing, of the area's native inhabitants."

Given that there are still significant disputes as to the plan's purpose, I suggest we leave controversial assessments out of the lead. Amayorov (talk) 08:16, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

It says "Historians describe Plan Dalet, in which Zionist forces shifted to an offensive strategy, as the beginning of a new phase in the 1948 Palestine war." IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 15:35, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

I don't really mind this phrasing. But the original sentence goes beyond that: "Towards the end of the civil war phase, Zionist forces executed Plan Dalet, an offensive operation conquering territory for the planned establishment of a Jewish state." A strategy can be offensive for defensive purposes too, such as when the side defending itself goes on the offence. But calling it an offensive operation aimed at conquering is subject to discussion. Amayorov (talk) 16:03, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

Why did you remove the quote by Jamal al-Husseini? I think it's important to highlight that a ceasefire in mid-April 1948 was impossible and was rejected by both sides. The quote itself is corroborated by UNSC archives.

On April 16, the Palestinian Representative, Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, rejecting any ceasefire that does not undo the Partition Plan:

The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not attackers, not aggressors; that the Arabs had begun the fight and that once the Arabs stopped shooting, they would stop shooting also. As a matter of fact, we do not deny this fact. We told the world, during the last session of the General Assembly, that we could not accept our country being torn to pieces. [...] Our fighting is in compliance with a God-given right, that of self-defence. We are no invaders, and we are no aggressors, but we have to use the right that God has given us, as to anyone who is unprovokedly attacked.

Amayorov (talk) 17:42, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The quote is simply not WP:DUE for inclusion. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:20, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

But that is not a "minority view," it's an official statement by the Palestinian representative to the UN SC, taken from the UN archives. A similar quote is already included in the article, such as the United Nations Conciliation Commission from 23 October 1950 stating that "The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety." This quote is a manifestation of the same view, but from a much earlier date.

A better argument against its inclusion would be WP:PRIMARY, which however allows for use of primary sources to be used "with care" and "to make straightforward, descriptive statements of facts." Amayorov (talk) 08:43, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

Also, it's been mentioned and discussed in secondary sources. I've added one such source to the article. Alaexis_¿question? 08:59, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

We can't include every quote from the war though that's the point. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 15:36, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

But it's an important quote: a Palestinian representative admitting to the UNSC that they would not accept any ceasefire that doesn't undo the Partition. The date is also important – April 16, 1948, is approaching the zenith of the "second wave" in Morris' analysis. Amayorov (talk) 15:54, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

I removed this quote as being undue, @Alaexis, @Amayorov. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 00:05, 2 September 2024 (UTC)

I strongly disagree that it's WP:UNDUE for reasons that I've explained above. Amayorov (talk) 06:16, 2 September 2024 (UTC)

The text "On April 16, the Palestinian Representative, Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, rejecting any ceasefire that does not undo the Partition Plan" is sufficient, no? Why should the quotation be given such prominence? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 06:33, 2 September 2024 (UTC)

Actually, I concede. In this instance, the quotation could be moved out of the main text and into the “text=“ parameter of the reference that follows the statement. Would you reintroduce the edit please? Amayorov (talk) 01:07, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

Okay, I removed the quote. It can possibly be readded in a footnote.

Do you have a citation (from a secondary source) for the text "On April 16, the Palestinian Representative, Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, rejecting any ceasefire that does not undo the Partition Plan"? The citation @Alaexis added doesn't support the content. That citation (Sharan 2010) says: "The Palestinian and other Arab leaders were quite frank about having begun the war. Jamal al-Husseini, the acting chairman of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, told the United Nations Security Council on April 16, 1948: The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight." IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 02:14, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

Let me check the source. Alaexis_¿question? 07:11, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

The source for this is Husseyni's words on page 20 [1]

We have fought and we are now fighting the Partition scheme, we cannot have any truce on the basis of it. I'll add the source and add a secondary source needed tag. Alaexis_¿question? 07:19, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

The text now reads "On April 16, the Palestinian Representative, Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, saying he did not deny that "the Arabs had begun the fighting." Why is this due for inclusion? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 08:05, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

Without Husseini's assertion that the Arabs were the defenders and not the aggressors, this is source misrepresentation. Zero^talk 09:20, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

I agree Amayorov (talk) 09:38, 6 September 2024 (UTC)

@IOHANNVSVERVS, I restored the quote by Jamal al-Husayni from April 16, 1948, which highlights the rejection of any ceasefire that does not undo the Partition Plan. The quote is considered important for understanding the Palestinian position during this period. Consensus was not fully reached on the talk page. OdNahlawi (talk) 11:27, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

As a new user you seem to be unaware that WP:ONUS says that consensus is required for inclusion, not for exclusion. I also looked at your additional source Sharan and saw a junky propaganda tract. Hell is going to freeze over before we cite a work that puts "refugees" in scare quotes and tells blatant lies like "The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence strongly indicates that it was Arab, not Israeli, actions that were the primary cause of the displacement of Palestinian Arabs in the war." Zero^talk 12:05, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

OK OdNahlawi (talk) 12:57, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

When I said that this is source misrepresentation, I meant that including the reference WITHOUT specifying that al-Husayni did not deny that "the Arabs had begun the fighting" is source misrepresentation. A reference to this quote IS important, even if it isn't quoted verbatim. I've laid out my arguments for it above. Complete removal of a reference to the quote is wholly unwarranted. Amayorov (talk) 13:03, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

@Zero0000 WP:ONUS was already discussed. This thread was only about whether it is appropriate for the quote to be included verbatim. I conceded that it's okay for the quote to be paraphrased (WP:OVERQUOTING). Even this is a contentious point. But you have deleted any reference to the quote altogether. Amayorov (talk) 13:10, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

@Amayorov: I've never said that it shouldn't be mentioned at all, though the case for it is not strong. I said that this particular way of mentioning it was source misrepresentation. The reason polemic sources like to quote just these few words is that they seem to quote Husseini admitting that the Arabs were the aggressors. But on the contrary Husseini explicitly denied that the Arabs were the aggressors in the same speech: "We are no invaders, and we are no aggressors, but we have to use the right that God has given us, as to anyone who is being unprovokedly attacked." Husseini is saying that the Jews were the aggressors and the Arabs were exercising their right to defend themselves. Moreover, this is just the standard Palestinian position, not something exceptional or particularly interesting. Zero^talk 13:37, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

You didn't say it, but you deleted any reference to that quote in your edit. I undid your deletion.

I agree that misrepresenting the quote to say that the Arabs are the aggressors would be incorrect. Its main significance is that it provides evidence that (1) the Arabs rejected any ceasefire that wouldn't undo the Partition, (2) they Arabs initiated at least some of the direct hostilities (justifiably or not). Amayorov (talk) 13:46, 8 September 2024 (UTC)

The current text says nothing about the Arabs being the aggressors so I don't think the reader would be misled, especially since the quote is provided in a footnote. Alaexis_¿question? 11:55, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

I see the rubbish source Sharan is back. This is utterly unacceptable, and it will not stick. Zero^talk 14:51, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, what's the problem with this source? Alaexis_¿question? 11:00, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Ah, I see your comment below. Let me check it again. Alaexis_¿question? 11:01, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I share Zero's concerns with the Shlomo Sharan source. As Zero pointed out it says "The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence strongly indicates that it was Arab, not Israeli, actions that were the primary cause of the displacement of Palestinian Arabs dtring the war. The most important fact that many people naively ignore or deliberately forget is that the war was begun by the Arab states’ aggressive invasion of Israel immediately upon its formal recognition by the United Nations. The Arabs declared without hesitation their aim to annihilate the Jews and demolish their state. If any massacres and/or ethnic cleansing took place, they were performed by the Arabs only." This is Nakba denial.

@Amayorov, @Alaexis, do you not agree that this source is unreliable given the above? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 16:43, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

I agree with Zero, that line is taken out of context and gives a complete distortion of both what he said and what happened. nableezy - 16:54, 9 September 2024 (UTC)

It shouldn't be necessary, but it's sort of fun, to see what crap books like Sharan's contain. "There was no “ethnic cleansing” of Arabs. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain how 400,000 were left behind" (almost 3 times the true figure). "Yasser Arafat was a nephew of Haj Amin al-Husseini." "Islam developed a relentless and unequivocal hatred of Jews". "The first Muslim to recognize the importance of Jerusalem was Haj Amin Al-Husseini." "The hatred instilled in every Palestinian child is sufficient to explain why Israel set up the road barriers." The whole book is an extended rant with a lie on every other page. Zero^talk 02:27, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Where did you find this source @Alaexis? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 03:02, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Yeah, this is probably not a good source. I have no idea where he took the 400k number from. Alaexis_¿question? 11:08, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Yes, I agree that this particular source doesn't look reliable. Thank you to @Zero0000 for going through it.

However, on a general note, I don't think that the "Nakba denial" argument is good, given how easily it ventures into dogmatism. Even respectable authors, such as Morris, have made similar well-documented observations that overlap with the your quotes. Dismissing them out-of-hand is simply not WP:DUE. Amayorov (talk) 15:19, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Please show where Benny Morris has said anything resembling any of the above. nableezy - 16:14, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Just a couple examples:

(1) There was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel ‘the Arabs’ from Pales- tine or the areas of the emergent Jewish State; and the Yishuv did not enter the war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war ‘transfer’ thinking ever translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion. [...] and hence, at war’s end, Israel emerged with a substantial Arab minority, of 150,000. (Morris 2008: p.588)

(2) His documentation of instances when the Arab commanders issued whole-sale evacuation commands to the Arab population. Such as in Haifa, where from April 22 1948 onwards, Morris states that there is "a surfeit of evidence" that the Arab leaders both ordered and encouraged the evacuation. (Morris 2004: p.195-200)

All of this would qualify as "Nakba denialism" in its broadest definition. Amayorov (talk) 16:23, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

You’re aware of the difference between 150k and 400k right? nableezy - 20:00, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

Yes, this particular author's figure of 400k is strange. Zero000 has shown other inaccuracies in his work. I don't defend that source, I'm only pointing out that "Nakba denialism" is a bad historical argument. Amayorov (talk) 20:19, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

I agree that whether or not a source is some sort of denialism is both not a criteria for inclusion as a reliable source or relevant in any way here. But glad we agree the source is not worth citing. nableezy - 00:27, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

I think @IOHANNVSVERVS would disagree as they have used this argument repeatedly, such as here and here.

What this results in is a widely distorted picture, due cherry-picking a historian's work and filtering out the parts that don't fit into a dogma. Amayorov (talk) 00:53, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

Morris does dabble in "Nakba denialism in its broadest definition" and there are numerous RS which affirm this. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 20:05, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

"Nakba denialism in its broadest definition" becomes dogmatism and cheer-picking reputable historical work to fit a presupposed view of the conflict. Amayorov (talk) 20:07, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis, this is not a compromise. A number of editors have objected to this content and no RS have been provided to even suggest that it may be due. Not to mention how ridiculous of a statement it is to say "Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, saying he did not deny that "the Arabs had begun the fighting" and at the same time that they were not aggressors." IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 15:49, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

It is also OR to decide which statements should be included. nableezy - 16:14, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

I cannot see how this content can be not due. It's an official statement by a representative of a belligerent side to the highest diplomatic authority in the world, indicating their position on the conflict. The reputability of the publishing source cannot be better. The quote meets all the requirements of WP:PRIMARY.

A problem arises when we try to "analyse, evaluate, interpret, or synthesis material found in a primary source yourself". Therefore, I suggest that we simply restore the quote verbatim, as it used to be. If you do so, all the contradiction about "the Arabs had begun the fighting" and "were not aggressors" gets resolved. This doesn't have to be complicated. Amayorov (talk) 16:17, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Weight is determined by the weight secondary sources give something not what a Wikipedia user thinks is important. Or should we include quotes from Zionist leaders calling for the wholesale removal of the native population as well? Cus I can provide those too. nableezy - 16:19, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

Were they official statements, unequivocally representing the Yishuv? Then perhaps we should! But a statement to the UNSC by an official delegate is similar to the Clause 10 of Cablegram dated 15 May 1948, which is also currently included as a primary source. Amayorov (talk) 16:35, 10 September 2024 (UTC)

@IOHANNVSVERVS @Alaexis Please share your views Amayorov (talk) 13:35, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

My views on what? Nableezy's statement "Weight is determined by the weight secondary sources give something not what a Wikipedia user thinks is important" is correct. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:31, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

WP:PRIMARY specifies when primary sources can be used in their own right. Common examples found throughout Wikipedia include declaration of war, treaty proposals, state proclamations etc. Here you have a statement to the U.N. by an official representative of a warring side, at the height of hostilities. Its publication is also decidedly reputable (U.N. archives) and can be verified by anyone.

The main restriction on such material is that it editors mustn't analyze, evaluate or interpret it. In this case, it should be included verbatim, just as Clause 10 of Cablegram from 15 May is included. Amayorov (talk) 18:19, 11 September 2024 (UTC)

I agree that the position of a representative of one side of the conflict and a member of its government body delivered to the UN is notable and should be present in the article. Alaexis_¿question? 12:16, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

"In determining proper weight, we consider a viewpoint's prevalence in reliable sources, not its prevalence among Wikipedia editors or the general public." WP:WEIGHT. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 12:32, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

This applies to a "viewpoint"'s relevance. But an official statement by a representative isn't a viewpoint. This appears to be covered by WP:PRIMARY, and is applied widely throughout Wikipedia, including declaration of war, treaty proposals, state proclamations, ec. Amayorov (talk) 12:37, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

That isn’t true, determining the weight a given statement should have is something we leave to secondary sources. Including what you think is important is OR. Beyond that, it seems clear here consensus is not in favor of inclusion. nableezy - 12:42, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

I see no clear consensus and would suggest to potentially open a WP:RFC Amayorov (talk) 12:46, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

Sure, but consensus is required for the inclusion of disputed content. You are welcome to seek that consensus but you dont have it here. Until you do, the material should stay out. nableezy - 15:13, 12 September 2024 (UTC)

Sure Amayorov (talk) 15:22, 12 September 2024 (UTC)